The role of the Official Sector institutions as lenders in crisis situations has evolved over time, and, particularly in the context of the current euro area debt crisis, into something akin to a lender of last resort. Institutions like the International Monetary Fund regularly provide distressed sovereigns with lending at affordable rates when private funding has dried up. To be able to provide this kind of emergency relief in a manner that does not result in large losses for their stakeholders, these Official Sector institutions often assert that their lending will have de facto priority over private lending. As a practical matter, since other creditors could not sue to interfere with the sovereign's choices regarding whom to pay and in what order, de facto priority was all that was needed in the past for the system to function. All of this may have changed since October 2012 as a result of one case: NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina. This case has given private creditors, for the first time in history, a weapon with which they can go after payments made to any other creditor that has equal legal priority to them, potentially including any Official Sector institution without de jure priority. This leads to the question of whether Official Sector institutions' half-century-old claim of de facto priority for their lending status can be said to have evolved, as a matter of customary international law, to a level of de jure priority.
Introduction
In March 2012, Greece executed the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history. 2 The restructuring asked holders of government bonds to take a significant haircut, and because a supermajority of creditors agreed, all creditors were bound under the bonds' collective action was the meaning of a standard provision in the defaulted debt instruments, something called the pari passu clause (pari passu means "in equal step" in Latin). The hedge fund, NML Capital ("NML"), was arguing that the presence of that clause meant that Argentina could not preferentially pay some creditors while ignoring the claims of others. Further, NML wanted the court to threaten to impose sanctions on any and all who might assist in violation of the clause.
The Second Circuit, for the most part, was persuaded. It fully agreed with NML on the interpretation of the clause and it mostly agreed with them on the enforcement mechanism. 6 Because the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case in June 2014, the Second Circuit's decision will stand for the foreseeable future.
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The 800-pound gorilla in the corner throughout the litigation was the implications for Official Sector lending, particularly with the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). A key element of Argentina's argument was that if the court sided with NML-interpreting pari passu to mean that all unsecured creditors had to be paid proportionally-its ruling would be inconsistent with the IMF's long-accepted de facto priority as a lender. 8 Therefore, Argentina contended, that interpretation surely had to be wrong. 9 Yet NML was clever enough to recognize that this was going to be a stumbling block for them and stipulated in its brief that, of course, it had no interest in going after IMF funds (something that they could afford to do since Argentina had paid off all its IMF obligations a long while ago). 10 The Second Circuit took the path afforded to it by NML and punted on the issue, saying that the question of Official Sector priority was not before the court and, in any event, the creditors had made clear that they were not after payments that were due to organizations such as the IMF. , these lenders would be unable to safeguard countries on the brink of crisis, which would not only force more countries into default, but also serve to destabilize the international financial system as a whole."). 9 Multiple commentators have also made this point with respect to the pari passu interpretation being advanced by NML. 31 There is language in some ICJ cases that might be seen as supporting this perspective, but these bits and pieces of language do not add up to a consistent theme. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 70 (July 8) (suggesting that the normative character of a rule helps determine whether it satisfies the conditions for being opinio juris).
What we know from the commentary and plain logic is that courts do often look at the past practices of states to determine the first prong of the traditional definition of CIL, which is evidence of past practices. But, given that we easily satisfy prong one, it is the second prong that concerns us: the opinio juris bit of the equation. In theory, then, the best approach would be to code the various court decisions for the evidence that courts examine on the second prong alone.
Unfortunately, we quickly realized when we began our coding that the court decisions were not going to cooperate. Courts in this area, it turns out, do not neatly separate out the evidence that they look at in terms of saying at X piece of evidence helped persuade them on prong one and Y piece of evidence helped persuade them on prong two. Instead, they tend to bundle all the evidence into a single discussion and then assert whether the two-prong test is satisfied (and sometimes they don't even mention the two-prong test). Given that reality, our inquiry reports on the evidence that courts look to when confronting CIL, then tries to back out the question of what pieces are likely to have impacted the opinio juris determinations.
a. Which Courts?
Historically, the most important court in terms of determinations of customary international law has been the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). This is the court whose determinations are cited to most often by scholars and other courts as the key authority in terms of what CIL is and how it should be determined. We, therefore, collected all of the cases ever decided by the ICJ that could arguably be said to have made determinations of CIL. We supplemented those cases with determinations of the ICJ's predecessor court, the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). In addition, we examined a subset of decisions from the numerous other international tribunals, such as the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"). We did not have the resources to collect the decisions of every one of these secondary international tribunals. Hence, we tried to limit ourselves to the most important decisions. We did that by looking to all cases from these tribunals that were cited in the 2013 report of the International Law Commission's ("ILC") study group on CIL. 32
To obtain our observations, we searched each database of cases for all of the judicial opinions that discussed any one of the following terms: "custom", "international law", "customary international law", "opinio juris", "practice" or "law of nations". As noted, we supplemented the list of cases here with the cases mentioned in the 2013 draft of the ILC's report on CIL. Once cases had been identified, we examined the portions of the opinions discussing CIL and coded each determination of CIL for the types of evidence that were discussed as either rising to the level of CIL or not. Within a single case that might have multiple CIL issues in it, we coded each issue separately. If there were dissenting or concurring opinions that were doing independent analyses of the CIL question, we coded those separately as well. The goal was to examine a wide array of judicial determinations so as to try and understand how judges and courts got around the intractability problem in the traditional definition of CIL.
We encountered a few threshold issues. The first was whether to code only opinions that concluded that there was CIL or also those that concluded that CIL was not present. The argument in favor of limiting the data to cases affirmatively finding CIL is that since we are interested in examining the type and amount of evidence courts think is adequate to find CIL, we should limit our analysis to those instances where CIL was found. The counterargument is that the types of disputes that end up in court-particularly at the appeals level or at the level at which states are willing to go to an international tribunal-will necessarily be those where the legal questions is be a close one. Otherwise, as the research on the economics of litigation teaches us, the cases would have settled. This approach is also relevant if one believes thatconsistent with a large body of literature on judicial behavior-factors other than simply the quantum of evidence can make a difference as to the outcome in close cases. 33
The second threshold issue was whether to code only cases from one type of courts (the ICJ, for example) or include a variety of types of courts. On the matter of including multiple courts, including domestic courts, the argument in favor of limiting the analysis to international tribunals such as the ICJ is that domestic courts are often going to be biased towards domestic 
b. Which Variables?
In choosing the variables to code for, we began with the standard rule (extensive practice plus opinio juris) and set forth the types of evidence that the definition likely contemplated. Next,
we did an initial round of coding of roughly a dozen ICJ cases to look at what types of evidence they were citing as support for their inquiries. The combination of those two steps gave us twelve evidentiary variables to code for. The variables fit roughly into four categories described below.
By looking at the kinds of evidence that courts use in applying the standard CIL rule of evolution, we hope to draw inferences about how they are tackling the problems posed by the rule. b. Case Law -Domestic Cases: The rationale for using municipal court decisions as evidence is the same as that for international tribunal cases.
We recognize that others might disagree with our categorizations of the variables. For that reason, we report the results on all the variables individually.
In addition to the foregoing variables, we also coded for agreements among the parties regarding what the applicable CIL was. We had not expected this to be a relevant form of evidence, but came across it in a handful of cases.
In terms of coding the variables, we coded the number of unique items that were cited in each judicial determination (what we call observations). If the treaty creating the International
Monetary Fund was cited, we counted that as 1 in the treaty column. If, in addition, the treaty implementing the European Stabilization Mechanism was also cited, our number of treaties cited tally went up to two. We did not count the number of times some piece of material was cited though; just whether it was cited.
The final two variables we coded for were case level controls, rather than evidentiary, to help us determine whether different categories of cases apply CIL differently. is applying the two-part definition are ones that the judge is more serious about illustrating how the definition applies. We therefore code the cases for whether they are ones in which the twopart definition is explicitly invoked.
IV. Analysis a. The Total Counts
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the full dataset, in terms of the pieces of evidence described above (for simplicity, we have combined some of them Instead, the type of evidence that looks to be the most important for determinations of CIL is the international treaty. In the 140 CIL determinations, there were 275 citations to treaties, telling us that treaties are by far the most important type of evidence in CIL determinations.
After citations to treaties come citations to prior cases (domestic and international)-what we
expect are largely citations for procedural reasons. As noted earlier, the fact that treaties are cited at all as evidence of CIL is puzzling if one expects to see that the traditional definition being followed. Treaties, after all, typically are entered into because there is no existing law and nations need some law. In other words, they are an indicator of the absence of law, rather than the presence of it (that is, the opposite of opinio juris). Yet here, we find that not only are treaties cited, but they are the dominant type of material cited in CIL determinations.
Although most treaties are forward-looking, and the traditional definition of CIL asks for backward-looking evidence, there are exceptions to the objection to treaties as evidence for CIL.
In the case of some treaties, for example, the drafters of the treaty might purport to be doing nothing more than codifying established and consistent state practice. In those cases, however, one would expect the court in question to specify that it was citing a treaty because that treaty represented a codification of past state practice and opinio juris. Moreover, other courts, international bodies, and scholars have recognized that the principles set out in the London Charter and applied by the International Military Tribunal are significant not only because they have garnered broad acceptance, but also because they were viewed as reflecting and crystallizing preexisting customary international law. 37 Even if the drafters of the treaty did assert that they were codifying past state practice and opinio juris, it is not clear that a court, if it were following the traditional definition of CIL, should be able to assume that what was said by states during the codification process was true. Among the other complications involved in using treaties as evidence of widespread and settled state practices is that most treaties have only a subset of states that agree to them, as other states may not have even been invited to participate. Despite the numbers reported above, one might nevertheless wonder whether courts, while they are not looking to direct evidence supporting the traditional definition, are delegating the job of collecting the evidence and analyzing it to academic scholars. After all, the role that academic scholars played for a long time (and still do in some jurisdictions) was to collect evidence and synthesize law. From the citation count data in Figure 1 , we do see that there are a number of cites (roughly 50) to academic articles and treatises. But that is still no more than a little more than one cite to an article or treatise every third CIL determination; not enough by a long shot to support arguments about widespread opinio juris.
To recap, then, based on Figure 1 , it looks like courts are neither pursuing direct evidence fitting the traditional definition nor are they delegating that task to academics and treatise writers.
The vast majority of the action in CIL cases is occurring on the aspirational or forward-looking front; little is occurring on the traditional or backward-looking front. To borrow from Bradley's article on the chronological paradox in opinio juris, it looks as if courts are engaged in a type of common law adjudication -forward-looking adjudication focused on solving global problems as opposed to some kind of backward-looking historical aggregation of evidence (something that courts probably would not have the expertise to do, even if they wanted to).
38 38 See Bradley, supra note 18. The type of backward looking analysis that the CIL definition calls for, if taken seriously, would require courts to be experts in history, economics, political science, and anthropology, in addition to the expertise in law that we assume they have. One does not have to read more than a couple of these CIL opinions to realize that these courts are not demonstrating those types of expertise or borrowing it from the arguments of the parties. Rather, they are doing what pragmatic courts do.
b. Dealing with Outliers
Most of the determinations that we examined cited to only a handful of materials. This To correct the problem, we estimate counts of materials being cited, in individual cases, by giving a maximum score of 1 if a particular type of material is cited. So, if opinion A cites to 5 different treaties, we code that as a 1 (as opposed to a 5). What we get with this calculation is the fraction of CIL determinations that use treaties or direct evidence of state acts and so forth.
We end up undercounting the influence of individual variables here, but we correct for the problem of outliers. therefore, is essentially the same as in Figure 1 : it is the forward-looking or aspirational types of evidence that dominate the determination of CIL. Judges do look, to some extent, to evidence of past practices. But for the most part, the inference we draw from the data is that judges seem to be trying to figure out not what legal norms among states were in the past and whether they believed they were law, but rather what states generally believe should be law for their collective.
c. Parsing the Subsets
i. Explicit Mention of the Two-Part Test. In constructing our dataset of CIL determinations, we painted with a broad brush. We collected all of the determinations where it was even arguable that CIL was being determined. One objection to our analysis, therefore, could be that we are not in fact reporting on the set of cases where CIL is determined via the classic two-part test. That subset, it might be argued, is made up solely of the determinations where the two-part test is explicitly invoked.
To answer this objection, we coded each of our determinations for whether the two-part was explicitly invoked. Table 1 reports on the comparison of the types of evidence used in the subset of cases invoking the two-part test and the types used in the remainder of cases. We report here the percentage of times a type of evidence show up at least once in a determination (and not the raw numbers of times the type of evidence shows up). 39 In terms of our key variable, the use of treaties is higher in the determinations invoking the two-part test (78% of the determinations) than in the other determinations (58%). In other words, although the difference is not statistically significant, the primary result regarding the dominance of aspirational evidence of CIL, and particularly treaties, holds. should have focused on the cases where the tribunal found CIL (as opposed to looking also at the determinations where CIL was not found).
To answer the objection, we coded all of our determinations for whether CIL was found or not. as compared to where CIL is not found (55%). As with the prior parsing, the differences are not statistically significant on the use of treaties. The relevant point, though, is that the primary result holds even when we limit ourselves to the subset of cases where CIL is found. Fortunately, for our purposes, Table 3 shows little evidence of courts looking primarily to different types of evidence in rights cases versus those involving intergovernmental interaction issues. We see that treaties are cited significantly more often in rights-type cases (83%) than in those involving intergovernmental relations (54%), but the reality is that treaties are the most important type of evidence cited in either type of case. to whether courts can be persuaded that this would be a good thing for the community of nations.
V. Potential Objections
There are many strong arguments in favor of the IMF being granted preferred creditor status when it lends to nations in financial distress. 40 The simplest argument is that this is emergency financing that is given to a nation when it has lost market access. No one else is willing to lend and the IMF, reasonably, demands that if it lends at below-market rates under such conditions, it should be assured that the IMF will be repaid before the other creditors who lent during the good times.
The argument in favor of IMF priority strengthens if one considers the fact that the IMF, by its own rules, can only lend to one of these nations in crisis when either (a) it is confident that the crisis in question is a liquidity one rather than a solvency one (that is, market access has been irrationally withdrawn and will likely return), or (b) when a failure to support this nation presents a high degree of systemic risk or contagion. 41 The IMF is also not allowed to lend when a nation is not attempting, in good faith, to resolve its arrears with its prior creditors, 42 the goal here being to protect against the moral hazard problem of countries defaulting on private creditors too readily, in the expectation of receiving IMF support. All in all, IMF lending practices are set up with the intention that they be done in a manner that enhances global welfare.
The objections to the foregoing line of argument are that we have oversimplified and that IMF lending is rarely as benevolent as we have portrayed. Instead, it is politically driven by the interests of the IMF's largest shareholders and that the conditionality and austerity that the IMF almost always demands, particularly from weak nations, has more to do with enabling the expansion of western interests and often ends up worsening the financial crises in question.
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For purposes of our analysis, the foregoing normative debate over the degree to which priority for IMF lending is socially beneficial is not particularly relevant. What our analysis says is that the type of evidence courts are most likely to look to is aspirational evidence (what kind of rule would be good for the system) and that the lack of evidence of opinio juris is not going to be an absolute bar to a finding of a CIL doctrine on IMF priority. That said, and assuming that our preliminary empirical analysis holds up, there are still a number of objections that critics might raise about our project. Below, we list the three we have heard most frequently and our answers to them.
a. The IMF Might Not Want Legal Priority
A critic could validly point out that if the IMF had wanted legal priority, it could have easily negotiated for it in every one of its contracts. It did not, and perhaps that means the IMF believes that it is best for it and the international system for it to ensure compliance with its priority via informal pressures rather than formal ones. We concede that the foregoing is a possibility; indeed, it has been the status quo until now. remain-and they will either get out of the business of providing emergency financing to distressed nations or they will get sued a lot.
b. All Those CDS Contracts That Will be Triggered
The objection that we have heard most often has to do with the parade of horribles that will follow regarding credit default swap ("CDS") contracts. Most sovereign CDS contracts have as one of the events of default a change in the ranking or priority of the debt. Holders of these CDS contracts have in the past raised the argument that IMF lending to a nation in distress, where the IMF had preferred creditor status, is a change in their ranking (after all, they are now junior to the IMF in terms of priority). The answer to these CDS holders thus far has been that the IMF's preferred creditor status is a de facto one, not a formal legal one, and that their contracts are triggered only by a change in formal legal priority. Should a court state that, as a matter of CIL, the IMF now had formal legal priority for its lending, would that not bring all those past holders of CDS contracts who were denied their claims (or didn't make them) in the context of IMF programs for countries like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, rushing back in?
The point is a fair one, but there is a legally familiar answer. Courts do occasionally reinterpret laws in ways that mean that actors who might not have had a claim some years prior (and, therefore, did not bring it) now realize that they may have a claim under the new legal interpretation. Such reinterpretations, though, do not necessarily bring a flood of litigation.
Statutes of limitations for most contract claims are generally no more than a few years. Thus, in the context of our immediate inquiry, many of the claims against the IMF will likely have expired. Moreover, given that the IMF has control over when-or if-it asserts its CIL claim, it can make sure that it does so strategically to avoid the greatest possible amount of litigation.
Further, the IMF could argue that many of the past claims would not be valid because the court would be saying that CIL on IMF priority has evolved, at this point in time, from a norm to a law.
Past claims arguably were under the old de facto priority regime and not the new de jure priority regime.
c. No Turning Back
One of the great virtues of CIL is that it evolves, and when needed, it can evolve quickly.
Courts can use it to tackle problems caused by unexpected shocks to the system (such as the decision on NML v. Argentina); this is particularly valuable in contexts such as international law, where lawmaking is otherwise extremely difficult even if the majority of nations agree on one particular legal path. A considerable downside of CIL, though, is that once it is deemed to have evolved from norm to law, reversing course is extremely difficult. Hence, if it turns out that the IMF successfully asserts the CIL argument and then realizes, after seeing how it works for some years, that de jure priority status is causing immense problems, there is no easy mechanism to reverse course under the conventional understanding of CIL. Enough nations would basically have to violate the new CIL, such that a court could look to all of those violations to say that new CIL had evolved. To that end, the IMF and its member nations should think hard before they assert that IMF priority should be deemed to have evolved from de facto to de jure priority. 44 
VI. Conclusion
The Second Circuit's October 2012 decision in NML v. Argentina has caused much consternation in the sovereign debt world. Breathing life into a formerly catatonic contract provision, the court held that a sovereign cannot pay some bondholders while neglecting to pay other holders of the same type of bonds-that is, unless clear legal priority separates those bondholders. De facto preferred creditor status, like that traditionally enjoyed by Official Sector institutions such as the IMF, simply no longer cuts it. And without this preferred status, the IMF may be unable to fulfill its lender-of-last-resort role, which in turn could harm the entire system of international finance. Irrespective of one's normative stance regarding the role of the IMF, this uncertainty is concerning.
CIL may provide a solution to this problem. To see how, one has to go beyond the conventional CIL doctrine to an analysis of how courts actually decide CIL matters. We find that courts tend to use forward-looking evidence when confronting questions of CIL-a far cry from the state practice/state belief paradigm that dominates the textbooks. Instead of determining whether the quantum of state practice and opinio juris merits a finding of CIL, courts appear to modify the inquiry to whether states would want a particular norm to be law.
Under this conception of CIL, a court could legitimately find that the traditional and established norm of the IMF having de facto preferred creditor status has now evolved into a de jure preferred creditor status. As such, the IMF's position as a preferred lender may not be imperiled after all.
Before concluding, we note a handful of caveats to our analysis.
First, our empirical analysis only scratches the surface in terms of sophistication of analysis and the size of the data analyzed. We only report simple counts and graphs and have limited the scope of our inquiry to cases from international tribunals. A critic could point out that the majority of CIL determinations are by domestic tribunals. Further, a dispute over IMF priority is most likely to arise in a case in either English or New York domestic courts rather than the ICJ because most debt contracts are governed by the laws of those jurisdictions and because private investors cannot get to the ICJ unless some state supports their claim. Our hope is that future studies will look at a larger number of cases and use more sophisticated empirical tools.
Second, by focusing on the issue of IMF priority and avoiding the question of whether other Official Sector institutions like the European Central Bank, The World Bank, the European Investment Bank and so on are deserving of similar status, we have arguably ducked the hardest question about Official Sector priority. This is so for at least two reasons. First, the lending of these institutions is not quite so clearly "lender of last resort" lending and, therefore, the 
